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At the end of August 2014, scientists and policymak-
ers from forty-eight countries gathered at the Her-
itage Hotel in Auckland, New Zealand to debate the
science and art of scientific advice.1 Jointly hosted by
Sir Peter Gluckman, chief scientific advisor to the
PrimeMinister of New Zealand, and the Internation-
al Council for Science (ICSU), the Auckland summit
was the largest ever meeting of its kind, attracting
science advisors, advisory bodies and academic ex-
perts fromAlbania to Zimbabwe, and a host of coun-
tries in between.
Over two days of intense discussion, participants
debated structures and methods for the provision of
scientific advice in emergency situations, across na-
tional and disciplinary boundaries, and on contested
topics, where science, values and politics collide. The
meeting ended with a call to strengthen collabora-
tion between advisory systems, an agreement to for-
malize thenetwork, and a commitment tomeet again
in 2016. As Sir Peter Gluckman said afterwards: “Our
goal was to start a global conversation on the prac-
tices and challenges of conveying science advice to
governments…The meeting has highlighted a real
thirst among practitioners to share models and
lessons.”2
Several speakers at the Auckland summit empha-
sised the need to respect the diversity of different ad-
visory systems. But themeeting also reflected a grow-
ing enthusiasm in certain quarters for the chief sci-
entific advisor (CSA), as a particular institutional
remedy to the challenge of strengthening the inter-
face between science and policy. For European ob-
servers of these debates, the Auckland meeting was
timely, coming just weeks after a high-profile contro-
versy erupted about the merits or otherwise of reap-
pointingaCSAto thePresidentof theEuropeanCom-
mission; a post which was first created in 2012, and
is now up for renegotiation, as part of Jean-Claude
Juncker’s new Commission.3
This paper explores the evolution of the CSA role,
from its origins in the US and UK, to its increasing
popularity in other national and international con-
texts. It distils some of the lessons learned in recent
years about the strengths and limitations of the CSA
model. And it reflects on what the recent argument
over a European Commission CSA reveals about the
politics and prospects for scientific advice.
I. The scientific states we’re in
Scientific advice has never been in greater demand;
nor has it been more contested.4 From climate
change to cyber-security, poverty to pandemics, food
technologies to fracking, the questions being asked
of scientists, engineers and other experts by policy-
makers, the media and the wider public continue to
multiply. At the same time, the authority and legiti-
macy of these experts is under increasing scrutiny,
particularly in the wake of controversies over partic-
ular technologies and episodes such as ‘Climate-
gate’.5
Acrossmany governments and international insti-
tutions, the arrangements and methods for scientif-
ic advice and evidence-informed policymaking are
being actively debated, and in some cases, new struc-
tures are being established. In recent years, New
Zealand and the European Commission are among
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those to have appointed their first chief scientific ad-
visors6; countries such as Finland and Japan are cur-
rently reviewing the organization of their systems7;
at an international level, fresh expert assessments are
underway, such as IPBES (the Intergovernmental
Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services)8;
and new advisory committees have been established,
for example a Scientific Advisory Board to the Unit-
ed Nations.9
Institutions for scientific advice reflect distinctive
cultures and traditions of decision-making; what
Sheila Jasanoff has termed the ‘civic epistemologies’
throughwhich expert claims are constructed, validat-
ed or challenged in a given society.10 As Jasanoff ar-
gues, “good science in public decision-making can-
not be divorced from deeper reflection on the ways
inwhich democracies should reason”. Butwithin this
diversity, four structures stand out as most common-
ly used, often in combination, across particular sys-
tems:
– Advisory councils: many countries have a high-
level council for science (or science and innova-
tion) policy. Members typically include senior sci-
entists, alongside representatives of industry,
higher education and civil society. Examples in-
clude Japan’s Council for Science, Technology and
Innovation (CSTI), the UK’s Council on Science
and Technology, and theUS President’s Council of
Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST). In
Australia, chief scientist Ian Chubb recently an-
nounced that he plans to establish a new science
council to advise government on policy.11
– Advisory committees:most governments also re-
ly on an array of specialized scientific and expert
committees, which can address detailed technical
and regulatory issues in areas such as health, en-
vironment and food safety. For example, the US
and Japan have hundreds of such committees; the
UK has over seventy.
– National academies, learned societies and net-
works: A growing number of national academies
are active in science policy, and in economies such
as Canada, China, Germany, Netherlands, South
Africa, US and UK, academies are an important
source of scientific advice. Furthermore, networks
of national academies such as the International
Council for Science, with a membership of 121 na-
tional bodies, representing 141 economies, and 31
International Scientific Unions,12 and the InterA-
cademy Panel, the global network of science acad-
emies from 107 economies13 are actively involved
in science for policy processes at the internation-
al level (see Annex 1).
– Chief scientific advisors: the US appointed its
first presidential science advisor in 1957, followed
seven years later by the appointment of the first
cross-government chief scientific advisor (CSA) in
the UK. CSAs have also been appointed in Aus-
tralia, Cuba, Czech Republic, India, Ireland,
Malaysia, New Zealand and at the European Com-
mission. In the UK, additional SA roles have been
added gradually since 2002, and there is now one
in every government department (DSAs). New
Zealand is also adopting a DSA model.
None of these structures is perfect, and governments
typically rely on two or more of them in combina-
tion to create a broad ecosystem of expertise around
policy processes. In the UK, there is a clear hierarchy,
with the government chief scientific advisor as the
most senior figure. In the US, while the presidential
science advisor is also crucial, the system is more de-
centralized, withmultiple points of entry and less at-
tempt at central coordination. Despite the diversity
thatwe see, common challenges persist across all sys-
tems: how to protect the independence of advice
while ensuring that it is listened to; how to develop
a trustedrelationshipwithpolicymakers,whilemain-
taining transparency and accountability in the eyes
of the public and the science community alike; and
how to undertake appropriate quality assurance.
II. The science of scientific advice
Looking across these diverse systems, we see an
emerging body of best practice and analysis of what
6 See: http://www.pmcsa.org.nz/;
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-2014/president/chief
-scientific-adviser/index_en.htm
7 http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/aug/
29/crisis-renewal-and-the-prospects-for-science-advice-in-japan
8 http://www.ipbes.net/
9 http://www.sab-2014-berlin.de/
10 Jasanoff, S. (2005) Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in
Europe and the United States, Princeton University Press
11 http://www.theguardian.com/science/2014/aug/17/australias-chief
-scientist-tells-pms-business-adviser-to-stick-to-economics
12 http://www.icsu.org/about-icsu/about-us
13 http://www.interacademies.net/Academies.aspx
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works (or doesn’t) in particular contexts. How far can
we go towards defining and codifying a ‘science of
scientific advice’? This question was debated by par-
ticipants at the Auckland meeting, and several com-
mon challenges were identified:
1. How to meet the demands and
rhythms of the policy process
Debates about scientific advice often focus on the
‘supply-side’ of the science-policy interface. But the
‘demand-side’ is equally important: an effective ad-
visor needs a sophisticated understanding of how
policymaking processes work, and the pressures and
constraints underwhichministers, civil servants and
decision makers operate.
Policy challenges arise across different time hori-
zons, requiring very different responses. Modes of
scientific advice that are most useful in emergency
situations will rarely be the same as those required
for long-term foresight or horizon scanning.Over the
past decade, advisory bodies have had to navigate a
number of crises with scientific dimensions. Exam-
ples include SARS, bird flu, the Great East Japan
earthquake and tsunami, the Christchurch earth-
quake, hurricanes, flooding and the volcanic ash
cloud over Europe. As a result, countries such as
Japan, New Zealand and the UK now have improved
protocols for scientific advice inemergencies.14Akey
partof this involvescommunicating to thewiderpub-
lic, where providing clear advice, while acknowledg-
ing areas of scientific uncertainty, are the hallmarks
of mature crisis management.
Some structures, such as national academies, are
better suited to providing formal advice against a
longer time horizon, typically by convening expert
panels and producing detailed reports. Others, such
as chief scientific advisors, may find it easier to pro-
vide rapid, informal advice in emergencies, by gath-
ering inputs from a range of sources or forming ad
hoc working groups. Responding to the different
rhythms of policymaking, and striking the right bal-
ance between formal and informal inputs, are crucial
aspects of effective scientific advice.
2. The need to distinguish between
‘science for policy’ & ‘policy for
science’
In many systems, advisors or advisory bodies com-
bine a responsibility for the use of scientific evidence
in policymaking (‘science for policy’) with a role in
determining the budgets and structure of the re-
search and innovation system (‘policy for science’).
The lines between these can easily become blurred,
not least because areas of ‘science for policy’will have
implications for particular research priorities or the
funding structure. However, where possible, it is of-
ten useful to keep the two roles distinct, to avoid lim-
iting the advisory remit by being seen primarily as a
lobbyist for resources for science.
Given their proximity to the scientific communi-
ty, it can be a challenge for scientific advisors to ex-
tend the same commitment to impartial evidence to
the management of the research system that they
bring to other areas of policy. But it can be done: for-
mer US presidential science advisor John Marburg-
er won plaudits for his willingness to ask tough ques-
tions about the evidence base for research funding
in a 2006 speech, which led to the creation of the Na-
tional Science Foundation’s programme on the ‘sci-
ence of science and innovation policy’.15 Such efforts
should focus not only on the economic case for re-
search funding, but also on its social and public val-
ue, and on opening up debates about research prior-
ities to more diverse perspectives.16
3. The need for advisers to act as
intermediaries, brokers and
communicators
Scientists are typically appointed as advisors or ex-
pert committee members because of their deep ex-
pertise and standing in a particular field of research,
but (except in technical committees) they may only
rarely be asked to provide advice which draws on
their narrow area of expertise. More often, their role
is to act as intermediaries, able to translate, aggregate
14 See e.g. https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/scientific
-advisory-group-for-emergencies-sage
15 http://www.scienceofsciencepolicy.net/reference/marburger
-speech-aaas-forum-science-and-technology-policy
16 Rafols, I., Ciarli, T., van Zwanenberg, P. and Stirling, A. (2012)
‘Towards indicators for “opening up” science and technology
policy’ http://microsites.oii.ox.ac.uk/ipp2012/sites/microsites.oii
.ox.ac.uk.ipp2012/files/Rafols-Ciarli-OpeningUp-FULL.pdf
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and synthesize varied perspectives and sources of ev-
idence.17
Roger Pielke Jr. identifies several roles that scien-
tists can play in policymaking, and suggests that the
most crucial of these is the ‘honest broker’, who is
able to help decision makers to choose wisely be-
tween theavailableoptionsonagiven topic.18Ottmar
Edenhofer, who recently co-chaired Working Group
III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, offers a related metaphor of the scientific
advisor as a ‘cartographer’ or ‘map maker’ of policy
paths.19 It is important for advisors to be clear when
they are moving from ‘honest broker’ mode into
more explicit advocacy of a particular policy position
(as inevitably happens from time to time), as a fail-
ure to do so can undermine trust.
Another aspect of a scientific advisor’s intermedi-
ary role is to look beyond the scientific content of a
particular issue and communicate the broader
methodological principles and concepts that under-
pin scientific evidence. William Sutherland and col-
leagues suggest twenty key points (such as ‘no mea-
surement is exact’, ‘correlation does not imply causa-
tion’ and randomizationavoidsbias’) that policymak-
ers and the wider public should bear in mind when
interpreting scientific claims.20
4. The obstacles to resolving conflicts of
values through appeals to facts
Scientific advisors and advisory bodies spend a lot
of their time engaged in debates that reflect what
somehave dubbed ‘post-normal science’: where facts
are uncertain, values are in dispute, stakes are high
and decisions are urgent.21 Arguments over climate
change and GM crops are two obvious examples, but
there are many others.
Any issue where science is an important factor,
but where values, ethics and politics are also in ten-
sion, is unlikely to be resolved through a simple state-
ment of the scientific evidence.22 To assume a linear
relationship between evidence and policymaking is
often a mistake, and advisors need to recognize the
many ways in which evidence, values and political
judgments combine to produce decisions. As Sir Pe-
ter Gluckman argues, this is not to deny that science
‘should hold a privileged place’ among the types of
knowledge that may bemeaningful to policymakers,
but this privilege is fragile and depends on not over-
stating what is known, and on acknowledging scien-
tific limits and uncertainties.23
5. An increased reliance on
multidisciplinary &interdisciplinary
expertise
There is a growing recognition across advisory sys-
tems that identifying solutions to cross-cutting poli-
cy problems will require input not only from natur-
al scientists, but also from engineers, social scientists
and other experts. For example, in the UK, it is now
accepted that social scientists should formpart of the
network of departmental chief scientific advisors,
and the Parliamentary Office for Science and Tech-
nology recently established a social science section.24
Some argue for ‘chief social scientists’ or ‘chief histo-
rians’ to be appointed alongside chief scientists, but
creating separate structures ducks the more impor-
tant challenge of how to integrate an appropriatemix
of advice and evidence from a wide range of disci-
plines.25
In this context, it is helpful to distinguish between
multidisciplinarity, which is usually about building
better links between different disciplines, each of
which continues to rely on its usual methods and
modes of enquiry, and genuine interdisciplinarity
which encourages various disciplines to cross subject
boundaries, thus enabling, as Andy Stirling argues,
17 Mulgan, G. (2013) ‘Experts and experimental government’ in
Doubleday, R. and Wilsdon, J. Future Directions for Scientific
Advice in Whitehall. London: Alliance for Useful Evidence/CSaP
18 Pielke, R. Jr. (2007) The Honest Broker: Making Sense of Science
in Policy & Politics, Cambridge University Press.
19 Edenhofer, O & Minx, J. ‘Mapmakers and Navigators, Facts and
Values’ Science, 4 July 2014: Vol. 345 no. 6192 pp. 37-38.
DOI:10.1126/science.1255998; http://www.sciencemag.org/content/
345/6192/37.full?ijkey=Wox6TyUVE94Ts&keytype=ref&siteid=sci
20 Sutherland, W.J., Spiegelhalter, D. & Burgman, M. ‘Twenty tips for
interpreting scientific claims’, Nature 503: 335, 20 November
2013
21 Funtowicz, S. O., and Ravetz., J. R. "Science for the Post-Normal
Age", Futures, 25/7 September 1993, p. 739–755.
22 Sarewitz, D. ‘How science makes environmental controversies
worse’ Environmental Science & Policy, 7 (2004) 385–403
23 Gluckman, P. ‘The art of science advice to government’ Nature
507: 163-165, 13 March 2014
24 http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/impactofsocialsciences/2013/09/09/
exclusive-look-post-social-science-section/
25 Wilsdon, J. ‘Too many chiefs? Experts, advisers and the discipli-
nary mix’ The Guardian, 15 March 2013 http://www.theguardian
.com/science/political-science/2013/mar/15/science-policy
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‘more radical interactions between different styles of
knowledge, fostering potentially transformative so-
lutions.’26
Similarly, effective advisory systems now draw
their evidence from awide range ofmethods, includ-
ing scientific studies, randomized controlled trials,
statistical data, socioeconomic models and forecasts,
opinion polls, observational studies, and more qual-
itative modes of social analysis and public engage-
ment. The growing availability of online ‘big data’ al-
so has the potential to supplement and enrich exist-
ing methods.
Approaches to scientific advice that draw on a
more diverse range of disciplinary and methodolog-
ical inputsmay in turn lead to less emphasis on reach-
ing a ‘consensus’, which may obscure legitimate sci-
entific disagreements and uncertainties, in favour of
more ‘plural and conditional’ modes of advice. Andy
Stirling points to the way the UK Bank of England’s
Monetary Policy Committee reaches decisions on in-
terest rates, with differences of opinion among ex-
pert members made public and their rationale open-
ly discussed, and asks why scientific advisory
processes can’t operate on a similar basis?27
6. The need to link scientific advice to
wider developments in evidence-
informed policymaking
In a number of countries, governments are showing
a renewed enthusiasm for evidence-based policy and
more ‘experimental’ approaches to policymaking, in
which scientific methods, such as randomised con-
trol trials, are used to inform policy options.28 Exam-
ples include a new program on evidence and policy
in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, a new behav-
ioural sciences unit in the US Office of Science and
Technology Policy, and a UK government network of
‘WhatWorks’ evidence centres.29Aresurgence in the
field of intervention research has seen it move be-
yond health and human services into new areas of
policy testing as well.
These efforts are often being driven from the de-
mand side by policymakers and civil servants, and
may operate separately from structures for scientif-
ic advice. But the synergies between these agendas
are obvious, and scientific advisory bodies should po-
sition themselves at the forefront of this agenda.
7. Opportunities to link science policy
research more closely to practice
Geoff Mulgan reminds us that there is ‘a science as
well as a craft of scientific advice’, and argues that ad-
visors need to draw more systematically on research
in political science, social psychology, behavioural
economics, and science policy which investigates
‘why certain kinds of knowledge are acted upon, and
others are not.’30This requires concerted efforts from
both sides – academics and practitioners – to connect
the latest scholarship to advisory processes and prac-
tices. Building and operationalizing such links was
another focus of the Auckland meeting.
In a recent essay, Sheila Jasanoff distils insights
that can be drawn from three decades of research in
the field of science and technology studies (STS). She
acknowledges that the questions raised bySTS some-
times can be ‘associated with unproductive wheel-
spinning and relativism’, but insists that ‘the wheels,
in my view, can spin with traction.’ In democracies,
no institutions should place themselves beyond cri-
tique: ‘If judges may not presume to stand above the
law, still less should science advisers seek to insulate
themselves from the critical gaze of the science of
science advice.’31
8. The need to strengthen exchange and
learning across different systems
The primary aim of the Auckland conference was to
improve the exchange of ideas, lessons and best prac-
tices across different advisory systems. Other such
26 Stirling, A. ‘Disciplinary dilemma: working across research
silos is harder than it looks’ The Guardian, 11 June 2014 http://
www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/jun/11/
science-policy-research-silos-interdisciplinarity
27 Stirling, A. ‘Keep it complex’ Nature 468: 1029-1031, 23/30
December 2010
28 Sabel, C.F. and Zeitlin, J. (2012) ‘Experimentalist governance’ in
Levi-Faur, D. (Ed.) The Oxford Handbook of Governance. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
29 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/what-works
-evidence-centres-for-social-policy
30 Mulgan, G. ‘Experts and experimental government’ in Doubleday,
R. and Wilsdon, J. Future Directions for Scientific Advice in
Whitehall. London: Alliance for Useful Evidence/CSaP, April 2013
31 Jasanoff, S. ‘The science of science advice’ in Doubleday, R. and
Wilsdon, J. Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall.
London: Alliance for Useful Evidence/CSaP, April 2013
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meetingsdo takeplace, including theCarnegieGroup
of Science Advisors, which was established in 1991
to enable scienceministers and advisors from the G8
(now G8+5) nations to meet annually. But the Auck-
landmeeting was an ambitious response by the New
Zealand government and the International Council
for Science (ICSU) to calls for a more open and in-
clusive global forum for such discussions.32
There are links here to wider agendas around ‘sci-
ence diplomacy’ and collaboration in pursuit of
shared science policy goals. The OECD’s Global
Science Forum is also leading an ongoing project to
examine and strengthen scientific advisory systems,
which will report in 2015.33 Given the timeliness of
these debates, Auckland hopefully represented the
start of a broader conversation. Follow-up summits
on scientific advice are already planned in the UK in
2016 and in Japan in 2018. Every system can benefit
from a process that brings together advisers, policy-
makers, practitioners, experts and others on a regu-
lar basis to reflect on progress, share ideas and chart
future agendas for the ‘(art) and science of scientific
advice’.
III. Future directions for scientific
advice in Europe
TheAuckland summitwasparticularly timely fordis-
cussions over the future of scientific advice in Eu-
rope. Over the summer of 2014, a war of letters raged
between critics and supporters of the post of a CSA
to the President of the European Commission. The
incumbent, Professor Anne Glover, whowas the first
person to occupy the role, is due to stand down at the
end of October 2014, as part of the transition from
the Barroso to Juncker presidencies, and it is not yet
clear whether the role will be renewed.
Anne Glover does not disguise the difficulties she
has experienced in embedding the new role of a CSA
within existing Commission structures. In a frank
and passionate speech at the Auckland summit on
‘1000 days in the life of Chief Scientific Adviser’, she
gave an account of the progress she has made since
2012, and the problems that persist. One of the high-
lights of her last six months in office has been the
launch of a new network of scientific advisers from
twelve EUmember states.34But priorities for her suc-
cessor (assuming one is appointed) will include se-
curing better resources for the CSA (Glover current-
ly has a team of four staff), and ensuring that her of-
fice is better connected not only to the Presidency,
but also to the Joint Research Centre and other parts
of the Commission with capabilities and resources
to support evidence-informed policymaking.
Sittingabove these institutional challenges is abig-
ger political question around whether the European
Commission & Parliament can find better ways of
separating evidence-gathering processes from what
Glover terms the “political imperative”. Shehas called
in recent months for the creation of a central “evi-
dence service”within theCommission,workingwith
the CSA to assess all policy proposals in light of the
best available science. Such a function could poten-
tially be housed within the Joint Research Centre,
which has repositioned itself over recent years as an
analytical and evidence-gathering resource for Com-
mission-wide policymaking.
These debates received a surprising burst of pub-
lic and media attention over the summer of 2014,
whenagroupof environmentalNGOswrote a strong-
ly-worded letter to Juncker calling for the CSA role
to be scrapped. The letter argued: “The post of CSA
is fundamentally problematic as it concentrates too
much influence in one person, and undermines in-
depth scientific research and assessments carried out
by or for the Commission directorates in the course
of policy elaboration.” This intervention then
prompted a flurry of letters in response from scien-
tific bodies, research funders and business groups,
all of whom spoke up in support of the CSA role.
President Juncker has said that he will revisit the
question of how best to organize and source scientif-
ic advice for the Commission once he formally takes
up office in November 2014. Notwithstanding com-
plaints fromGreenpeace and others, there is a strong
likelihood that the CSA role will be renewed, but
Junker will hopefully also take this as an opportuni-
ty to address the structural and resourcing challenges
that Anne Glover has identified over recent months.
CSAs are not superheroes – they can’t singlehanded-
ly cut through the messiness and contestation that
so often occur when science, politics and policy col-
32 e.g. Doubleday, R. & Wilsdon, J. ‘Beyond the great and good’,
Nature 485 : 301-302, 17 May 2012
33 http://www3.grips.ac.jp/~gist/en/events/ws20131022.html
34 http://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2014/jun/
23/evidence-based-union-a-new-alliance-for-science-advice-in
-europe
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lide. But with proper support, sufficient resources
and appropriate protocols around independence and
transparency of advice, they can make a positive dif-
ference, as we see from a growing number of adviso-
ry systems around the world. More than anything
else, CSAs act as a magnifying device, able to draw
on a much wider and more distributed ecosystem of
expertise, and focus its contribution in a way that is
timely, relevant and useful to the policy process. It is
in the interests of all those who see evidence as vital
to effective policymaking that the role of Europe’s
CSA should survive into 2015 and beyond.
